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U.S. Climate Change Policy v. International
Trade Rules: Complying with GATT
by Tina R. Goel*

T

he Copenhagen negotiations did not result in the global
environmental treaty desired by many, but, instead, in
plans to reduce greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions or
carbon intensity from fifty-five nations, including China, India,
and the United States.1 The U.S. pledge, to reduce emissions
by seventeen percent, came with a catch: Congressional action.2
Enacting federal climate change legislation in the United States
has been difficult because policymakers fear that increased regulation may place domestic industry at a competitive disadvantage,
and that production facilities will relocate, thereby causing carbon
leakage—the movement of emissions to a less regulated country—and associated U.S. job losses.3 Manifesting these fears, the
Senate resolved, in 1997, that the United States should not consent
to an international agreement that does not limit emissions from
developing countries.4
Monumentally, in June 2009, the U.S. House of Representatives passed H.R. 2454, the American Clean Energy and Security
Act (“ACES”):5 legislation designed, in part, to reduce GHG emissions by placing a cap on emissions and issuing a certain number
of permits, or allowances, for the release of the emissions.6 One
measure, intended to alleviate carbon leakage, grants to eligible
domestic sectors allowance rebates, and another, the International
Reserve Allowance Program (“IRAP”) requires importers of foreign goods to submit international reserve allowances (“IRA”).7
Although Congress is unlikely to enact ACES, due in part to a
similar Senate bill, future legislation is likely to contain comparable language.8
Domestic rebates and importer allowance requirements, such
as those in ACES, are likely to violate U.S. obligations under the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”).9 GATT prohibits the use of trade-restrictive measures, i.e., taxes, laws and
regulations, to protect domestic industry, but it allows their use to
achieve legitimate environmental goals.10 In particular, Article I
prohibits discrimination by member nations between “like” products from different nations, and Article III prohibits discrimination
between “like” imported and U.S. goods.11 These rules are tempered by the Article XX General Exceptions, pursuant to which
member nations may employ measures violating substantive provisions for the achievement of limited policy goals, including the
“conservation of exhaustible natural resources.”12
The importer allowance requirement in ACES is likely to
violate GATT Articles I and III because it treats “like” products
dissimilarly. IRAP requires importers to submit IRAs based upon
a “general [calculation] methodology” to ensure that imported
and U.S. goods are subject to similar GHG emissions requirements.13 The calculation is likely to violate Article I if it treats
“like” foreign goods from two countries dissimilarly based upon
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non-product specific factors such as sector or economy-wide GHG
emissions.14 Five exceptions to IRAP largely exclude imported
goods from the program based upon factors that indirectly indicate if the imported goods are regulated similarly to “like” U.S.
goods, e.g., whether the imported goods originate in countries
with a binding emissions agreement, rather than whether fewer
emissions were actually released during the manufacture of the
product.15 These exceptions are also likely to treat “like” domestic
and imported products differently, violating Article III.
ACES is also likely to violate Article III by failing to provide
equality of competitive conditions for “like” U.S. and imported
goods by providing domestic actors avenues to lower compliance
costs unavailable to foreign producers. Domestic actors may demonstrate compliance by holding international and domestic allowances, offset credits, and compensatory allowances; banking and
borrowing allowances; submitting allowances received for “free;”
or paying a penalty for non-compliance, while importers may
only submit and bank IRAs.16 As a result, only domestic actors
may determine whether it is cost-effective to violate ACES and
pay a penalty or invest in forestry projects to earn offsets rather
than buy allowances, while importers do not have such options.17
Nonetheless, GATT Article XX permits certain trade-restrictive environmental measures and arguably should permit the use
of measures that “accurately assess carbon leakage and competitiveness losses” and impose a “fair” price upon imported products.18 To ensure that U.S. legislation is covered by the Article
XX exception, IRAP and its implementing regulations should
require importers to submit allowances based upon a methodology that accurately accounts for emissions. To avoid disparate
treatment between “like” products of two countries or between
“like” imported and domestic products, IRAP should calculate
allowance requirements based upon product-specific GHG emissions rather than economy-wide or sector-specific emissions. In
addition, importers should be permitted to submit offset credits, as
well as other allowances, and borrow allowances to equalize competitive conditions between “like” domestic and imported products. Moreover, to further the goals of ACES, exceptions should
only be granted when an imported product is manufactured with
fewer emissions than a “like” U.S. product, thereby challenging
domestic actors to reduce emissions.

Endnotes: U.S. Climate Change Policy v. International Trade
Rules: Complying with GATT continued on page 64
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See George Musser, Cool Roofs are Finally Cool, Sci. Am., July 30, 2009,
available at http://www.scientificamerican.com/blog/post.cfm?id=cool-roofsare-finally-cool-2009-07-30 (outlining one household’s experience with sustainable roofing).
39 See Cool Roof Rating Council, General Questions about Cool Roofing,
http://www.coolroofs.org/coolroofing.html#radiative (last visited Feb. 12,
2010) (explaining that “cool roofs” are offered in various colors).
40 Id.
41 See Rosenfeld, supra note 27, at 29 (opining that the same reflectivity of
roofs may be implemented in automobiles).
42 Canadell, supra note 12, at 1456.
43 Gordon B. Bonan, Forests and Climate Change: Forcings, Feedbacks, and
the Climate Benefits of Forests, 320 Science 1444, 1444-1449 (2008).
44 See National Geographic, supra note 10 (citing deforestation as a contributing factor to climate change).
45 IPCC, supra note 18, at 33.
46 Id. at 36.
47 Oak Ridge National Laboratory – Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis
Center, Recent Greenhouse Gas Concentrations, http://cdiac.ornl.gov/pns/current_ghg.html (last visited March 5, 2010).
48 Canadell, supra note 13, at 1456.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 1457.

Id.
Id.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Press Release, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Technology
Innovation Program, 2009 Technology R&D Competition to Address Civil
Infrastructure, Manufacturing (Mar. 26, 2009), available at http://www.nist.
gov/public_affairs/releases/20090326_tip_2009_comp_announce.htm.
59 Id.
60 American Clean Energy and Securities Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong.
(2009).
61 Press Release, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agriculture Secretary Vilsack Announces $900,000 for Urban and Community Forestry Grants: Costshare grants provide funds which are matched by recipient organizations (Oct.
28, 2009), available at http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/!ut/p/_s.7_0_A/7_0_1O
B?contentidonly=true&contentid=2009/10/0531.xml.
62 See id. (listing the ten organizations receiving grant funds).
63 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Brownfields and Land Revitalization, http://www.epa.gov/brownfields/about.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2010).
64 See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Constructed Treatment Wetlands, http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/pdf/ConstructedW_pr.pdf (last
visited Feb. 13, 2010) (outlining the fiscal benefits of constructed treatment
wetlands).
65 H.R. 2454.
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1

See John M. Broder, Countries Submit Emissions Goals, N.Y. Times, Feb. 2,
2010, at A10 (discussing the emissions goals); Richard Black, U.S. Bill ‘Crucial’ for Climate Talks, BBC News, Sept. 30, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/
fr/-/2/hi/science/nature/8283655.stm (last visited Mar. 1, 2010) (noting expectations for the Copenhagen talks).
2 See A Refreshing Dose of Honesty: Maria Cantwell and the Politics of
Global Warming, The Economist, Feb. 6, 2010, at 38 (discussing the commitment, the “catch,” and Senator Cantwell’s cap-and-dividend proposal).
3 See Black, supra note 1 (noting that in August 2009 Democratic senators wrote to President Obama declaring that to attract their support, any bill
regulating GHG emissions would have to protect the competiveness of U.S.
companies); J.D. Werksman & T.G. Houser, World Res. Inst., Competitiveness, Leakage and Comparability: Disciplining the Use of Trade Measures
Under a Post-2012 Climate Agreement 1-6 (2008), available at http://pdf.wri.
org/working_papers/competitiveness_leakage_and_comparability.pdf (discussing protective measures proposed in the U.S. legislature and considered by the
European Union in recent years); Committee on Ways and Means, Subcommittee on Trade, Chairman Levin Announces Hearing on Trade Aspects of
Climate Change Legislation, Mar. 17, 2009, http://waysandmeans.house.gov/
press/PRArticle.aspx?NewsID=10883 (last visited Mar. 1, 2010) (announcing a
hearing to discuss the trade aspects of climate change focused upon methods to
reduce carbon leakage and protect U.S. competitiveness). See also Chris Wold,
David Hunter & Melissa Powers, Climate Change and the Law 445 (2009)
(noting that the carbon leakage could be “significant”); Pew Center on Global
Climate Change, Implications for U.S. Companies of Kyoto’s Entry into Force
without the United States 4-5 (2002), http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/
Kyoto-USBusiness.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2010) (opining about the potential
competitive advantage enjoyed by U.S. companies relative to companies in
Kyoto Protocol signatory countries to the extent that economic costs are significant). But see WTO/UNEP Report (United Nations Environment Programme),
Trade and Climate Change vii, xviii (2009) (noting that studies to date illustrate
that the cost of compliance with an emission trading scheme is relatively minor
when compared to a firm’s overall costs, but that such schemes are relatively
young and more stringent emissions requirements may change those findings);
Wold, supra note 3, at 445 (arguing that the negative effects upon competitiveness are not apparent because pollution abatement costs are generally a small
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portion of total operating costs and that both businesses and environmentalists
argue that regulation will result in relocation, but that only the latter believes
the unregulated country will become a “pollution haven”).
4 See Byrd-Hagel Senate Resolution, S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997) (expressing that “the United States should not be a signatory to any protocol to, or other
agreement regarding, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change of 1992 . . . which . . . (B) would result in serious harm to the economy
of the United States”).
5 American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong.
(as passed by House, June 26, 2009). This bill is also referred to by the names
of its sponsors, Congressmen Waxman and Markey.
6 See John M. Broder, Obama Opposes Trade Sanctions in Climate Bill,
N.Y. Times, June 29, 2009, at A1 (reporting that President Obama has said that
ACES, along with the new automobile mileage standards and stimulus spending
on research and home weatherization, represents a change in American energy
policy). The bill aims to reduce GHG emissions to eighty-three percent below
2005 levels by 2050. See H.R. 2454 supra note 5, § 702 (establishing interim
levels of three percent below 2005 in 2012 and forty-two percent below 2005 in
2030).
7 See H.R. 2454 supra note 5, § 762 (defining carbon leakage as a substantial
increase of GHG emission, as determined by the Administrator, in other countries from industrial entities, if the increase is caused by an increased incremental cost of production in the U.S. as a result of implementing this Act); id.
§§ 763-64 (providing allowance rebates to eligible domestic sectors); id. § 768
(establishing the International Reserve Allowance Program).
8 See Broder, supra note 6 (noting the legislative activity from Congress is
far from certain); Michael Dworsky, et al., Stanford Inst. for Econ. Pol’y
Res., Pol’y Analysis Memo: Profit Impacts of Allowance Allocation Under
the American Clean Energy and Security (ACES) Act 1 (2009), available
at http://www-siepr.stanford.edu/GoulderSep2009.pdf (stating that if the Senate approves its own proposal that the entire legislature would then vote on a
integrated version); Black, supra note 1 (noting that the Boxer-Kerry proposal
introduced in the Senate on Sept. 20, 2009 aims for a higher initial emissions
cut than Waxman-Markey and leaves certain provisions, such as the allocations of emissions, open for discussion). See also Alina Syunkova, Nat’l
Foreign Trade Council, Inc., WTO – Compatibility of Four Categories of

64

U.S. Climate Change Policy (2007), available at http://www.nftc.org/default/
Trade%20Policy/Climate_Change/Climate%20Change%20Paper.pdf (discussing previous legislative proposals to address climate change). If a parallel bill
passes in the Senate, a joint committee must be formed to craft a compromise.
See H.R. Con. Res. 93, 108th Cong. (2003) (educating the public about how
laws are enacted).
9 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Legal
Instrument — Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter GATT]. See Broder, supra note 6 (noting that the bill contains a provision
requiring the President to impose a tariff on goods imported from countries that
do not act to limit their global warming emissions and that President Obama
thinks such a provision could be “illegal and counterproductive”).
10 See Wold, supra note 3, at 447 (noting that GATT has been successful in
significantly reducing tariffs over the past 60 years); Slayde Hawkins, Note,
Skirting Protectionism: A GHG-Based Trade Restriction under the WTO, 20
Geo. Int’l Envtl. L. Rev. 427, 430 (2008) (noting that such limitations on trade
barriers are in place because they have the potential to negatively affect the
world economy).
11 GATT, supra note 9, at arts. I, III. See Wold, supra note 3, at 447-8 (recognizing that Articles I and III also apply under the General Agreement on Trade
in Services (“GATS”) and Technical Barriers to Trade (“TBT”) Agreement).
12 See GATT, supra note 9, at art. XX (permitting measures: “(b) necessary to
protect human, animal or plant life or health . . . ; [or] (g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective
in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption . . . ”).
Such measures must “not [be] applied in a manner which would constitute a
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the
same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade.” Id.
13 See generally H.R. 2454 supra note 5, § 768 (establishing the international
reserve allowance program).
14 See Hawkins, supra note 10, at 442 (discussing similar provisions in the
Lieberman-Warner bill, S. 2191, 110th Cong. (2007) and concluding that
requiring different allowances from different countries for “like” products
violates Article I); see H.R. 2454 supra note 5, § 768(a)(1)(A) (specifying that
the Administrator shall issue regulations regarding the details of IRAP); id. §
768(b) (establishing that the number of IRAs required for a covered good in
an eligible industrial sector shall be adjusted for the benefit conferred by free
allowances and the value of emission allowance rebates distributed to eligible
domestic sectors).
15 See H.R. 2454 supra note 5, § 768(a)(1)(E) (excepting goods that originate
in “the least developed of developing countries,” countries with de minimus
GHG emissions, and countries that are party to a nationally-enforceable international agreement). Because international trade agreements provide different

standards for developing countries in other circumstances, the exception for
goods originating in “any foreign country that the United Nations has identified as among the least developed of developing countries” may be considered
appropriate. See id. § 768(a)(1)(E)(ii).
16 See H.R. 2454 supra note 5, § 722(b) (establishing the methods of demonstrating compliance for domestic actors); id. § 722(d) (listing the rules regarding the use of offset credits, term offset credits, and international emissions
allowances); id. §§ 728, 737, & 743 (discussing the terms of international
emissions allowances, international offset credits and domestic offset credits);
id. §§ 725, 782 (establishing the allocation, banking, and borrowing of allowances for domestic actors); id. § 721(f) (compensatory allowances are permitted, under certain circumstances, for the destruction of fluorinated gases). See
also Dworsky, supra note 8, at 5 (concluding that ACES provides industry
with more allowances than needed to maintain profits and that as a result the
“most energy-intensive industries are likely to enjoy increased profits”). Cf.
Matthew Nicely & Valerie Ellis, The Potential Clash of Climate Change Policy
and International Trade Law, 4 Bus. L. Brief (Am. U) 4, 7 (2007) (noting
that importers were largely ineligible for subsidies such as low-cost allowances through early reduction efforts, international and domestic offsets, and
sequestration projects in the Low Carbon Economy Act of 2007, S. 1766, 110th
Cong. (2007)). But see WTO/UNEP Report, supra note 3, at xviii (noting that
the potential insufficiency of alleviations and exemptions begs the question as
to whether measures to protect competitiveness and reduce carbon leakage are
necessary).
17 See Nicely & Ellis, supra note 16, at 7 (discussing such provisions in the
Low Carbon Economy Act of 2007, S. 1766, 110th Cong. (2007) and finding
that opportunities for domestic industries to earn allowances at lower prices due
to the time of the year, along with additional avenues to earn permits to emit
greenhouse gases that are not available to importers, can result in an accusation
that the U.S. is treating imported products less favorably than domestic products, because such measures lower costs of production and manufacturing for
domestic producers); Wold, supra note 3, at 491 (offering that some advocates
claim that offsets stifle innovations because permitting compliance via investing
in forest conservation is a “low-tech” solution). See also Wold, supra note 3, at
491 (noting that advocates believe that banking promotes early action by lowering costs). However, banking has the possibility to disrupt emissions trading by:
a) limiting innovation; b) decreasing the rates of overall emissions reductions;
and c) lowering the value of allowances. Id.
18 WTO/UNEP Report, supra note 3, at xviii. Border adjustments, to compensate for internal taxes, are a common measure upon the sale and consumption
of goods such as cigarettes or alcohol. Id. at xix. See generally WTO, Trade and
Environment, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/envir_e.htm (last
visited Mar. 1, 2010).

Endnotes: Equitable But Ineffective: How the Principle of Common But Differentiated Responsibilities
Hobbles the Global Fight Against Climate Change continued from page 53
2 See U.N. News Centre, World Has ‘Responsibility to Deliver’ in Year of
Crises, Ban Declares, Dec. 17, 2008, http://www.un.org/ apps/news/story.
asp?NewsID=29337&Cr=crises&Cr1= (last visited Jan. 29, 2009) (quoting UN
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon on the urgent need for a comprehensive and
balanced international climate change regime).
3 See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 3, Dec. 11, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998) [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol] (requiring that only the “Parties included in Annex I shall . . . ensure that
their aggregate [GHG] emissions . . . do not exceed their assigned amounts,”
while China is not an Annex I party).
4 See Juliet Eilperin, Developing Nations Plan Emission Cuts, Wash. Post,
Dec. 12, 2008, at A10 [hereinafter Eilperin, Developing Nations] (reporting that
getting emerging economies like China to limit their GHG emissions is considered crucial to the success of a global climate regime); see also Pew Center
on Global Climate Change and The Asia Society, Common Challenge, Collaborative Response: A Roadmap for U.S.-China Cooperation on Energy and
Climate Change 18 (Jan. 2009) [hereinafter Pew Center Report] (emphasizing
that China, along with the United States, must actively work to reduce GHG
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emissions in order to solve the global climate change problem).
Barbara Finamore, China’s Recent Steps Towards Meeting Its Climate
Commitments, Mar. 5, 2010, http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/bfinamore/
china_pushes_ahead.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2010) (reporting from a postCopenhagen round-up conference in Beijing that China views Copenhagen
as representing an unprecedented common political effort on a global scale to
address climate change and expressing optimism that “China is not sitting still
when it comes to addressing climate change”).
6 United Nation Framework Convention on Climate Change Conference of the
Parties, Copenhagen Accord (advance unedited version) at 3 (Dec. 18, 2009)
[hereinafter Copenhagen Accord] available at http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/
cop_15/application/pdf/cop15_cph_auv.pdf (agreeing that Non-Annex I Parties
like China will report their mitigation actions, and these reports “will be subject
to international measurement, reporting and verification”).
7 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9,
1992, 1771 U.N.T.S 107, 31 I.L.M. 849, entered into force 1 Jan. 1989 [hereinafter UNFCCC]; see, e.g., Jonathan B. Wiener, Climate Change Policy and
Policy Change in China, 55 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1805, 1807 (2008) (emphasizing
5
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